Daf Yomi — Chullin 128 (חולין קכח)Daf Yomi — Julín 128 (חולין קכח)דף יומי — חולין קכח

רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אִם אוֹחֵז בַּקָּטָן וְגָדוֹל עוֹלֶה עִמּוֹ – הֲרֵי הוּא כָּמוֹהוּ, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינוֹ כָּמוֹהוּ.

Rabbi Meir says: If when one grasps the small piece, the large piece ascends with it, it is considered one and the same; but if it does not ascend with it, it is not considered one and the same. This statement of Rabbi Meir is not in accordance with his statement in the mishna that a partially severed limb is part of the body of the animal and is rendered susceptible to impurity along with the body even if one lifts the partially severed limb and the body of the animal does not ascend with it.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מוּחְלֶפֶת הַשִּׁיטָה.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the contradiction and says: The attribution of the opinions in tractate Tevul Yom is reversed. Indeed, Rabbi Meir holds that even if when one lifts the smaller piece, the larger piece does not ascend with it, it is still the same item. Therefore, it is apparent that Rabbi Yoḥanan explains the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon in the mishna in accordance with the explanation of Abaye.

וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּילְמָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר בֵּין טְבוּל יוֹם לִשְׁאָר טוּמְאוֹת.

With regard to the contradiction between the two statements of Rabbi Meir, the Gemara asks: What is the difficulty? Perhaps Rabbi Meir distinguishes between the impurity of one who immersed that day and other types of impurity. The impurity of one who immersed that day is a more lenient type of impurity, because he has already immersed and need only wait until the end of the day in order to consume sacrificial offerings. Therefore, there is reason to be more lenient when he touches a partially severed piece of food and to rule that the entire food item does not become impure.

תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד טְבוּל יוֹם וְאֶחָד שְׁאָר טוּמְאוֹת.

The Gemara answers: One cannot make such a distinction between different types of impurity because it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to both the impurity of one who immersed that day and other types of impurity, the halakhot of contact are the same; whatever is considered contact that transmits impurity with regard to one type of impurity transmits impurity for all types of impurity.

וְדִילְמָא, לְרַבִּי לָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ, וּלְרַבִּי מֵאִיר שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ?

The Gemara asks: But perhaps Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not distinguish between the impurity of one who immersed that day and other types of impurity and Rabbi Meir does distinguish in such a manner. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Meir.

אָמַר רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי מוּחְלֶפֶת הַשִּׁיטָה.

Rabbi Yoshiya said: This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan meant to say: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who does not distinguish between the impurity of one who immersed that day and other types of impurity, there is a contradiction between the two statements of Rabbi Meir, and the attribution of the opinions in the mishna in tractate Tevul Yom is reversed.

רָבָא אָמַר: בְּיֵשׁ יָד לְטוּמְאָה, וְאֵין יָד לְהֶכְשֵׁר, קָמִיפַּלְגִי.

Rava said a different explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon: The mishna is discussing a case where the blood from the slaughter came into contact with the body of the animal but not with the partially severed limb, and both tanna’im agree that an animal constitutes a handle for its limb. They disagree with regard to the principle that there is a status of a handle, i.e., a handle is considered part of the item itself, with regard to transmitting impurity to the attached food, but there is no status of a handle with regard to rendering the attached food susceptible to impurity, as in that regard the handle is considered a separate item.

מָר סָבַר יֵשׁ יָד לְטוּמְאָה וְאֵין יָד לְהֶכְשֵׁר, וּמָר סָבַר יֵשׁ יָד לְטוּמְאָה וּלְהֶכְשֵׁר.

One Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that there is a status of a handle with regard to transmitting impurity, but there is no status of a handle with regard to rendering the attached food susceptible to impurity. Therefore, although the body of the animal constitutes a handle vis-à-vis the limb, it does not render the limb susceptible to impurity. And one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that there is a status of a handle both with regard to transmitting impurity and with regard to rendering the attached food susceptible to impurity. Therefore, the body of the animal renders the limb susceptible to impurity.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: בְּהֶכְשֵׁר קוֹדֶם מַחְשָׁבָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי.

Rav Pappa said a different explanation of the dispute: Both tanna’im hold that a handle renders the attached food susceptible to impurity. Yet, the mishna is discussing a case where the slaughter took place before the owner of the animal designated its meat for the consumption of a gentile. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree with regard to whether an item can be rendered susceptible to impurity before intention, i.e., before one intends to use it as food. Rabbi Shimon holds that since the animal came in contact with the blood of the slaughter before the owner intended to use it as food, it is not rendered susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Meir holds that the susceptibility to impurity takes effect such that when the owner considers it as food it will be susceptible to impurity.

דִּתְנַן, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: כָּךְ הָיָה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא שׁוֹנֶה – חֵלֶב שְׁחוּטָה בַּכְּפָרִים צָרִיךְ מַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ הֶכְשֵׁר, שֶׁכְּבָר הוּכְשַׁר בַּשְּׁחִיטָה.

This dispute is also found in that which we learned in a baraita (Tosefta, Okatzin 3:2): Rabbi Yehuda says that Rabbi Akiva would teach this halakha: Fat forbidden in consumption for a Jew from an animal slaughtered in the villages requires intention, i.e., designation, for consumption, for it to become susceptible to impurity. This is because the population in such places is small and there is an abundance of meat, so people do not generally consume the fat. Consequently, unless the Jewish owner intends for a gentile to consume it, it is not considered food. But the fat does not require contact with a liquid in order to be rendered susceptible to impurity, as it was already rendered susceptible by the blood of slaughter even though it came into contact with the blood before the Jew designated it for consumption.

אָמַרְתִּי לְפָנָיו: לִמַּדְתָּנוּ רַבֵּינוּ, עוּלְשִׁין שֶׁלִּקְּטָן וְהִדִּיחָן לַבְּהֵמָה, וְנִמְלַךְ עֲלֵיהֶן לָאָדָם – צְרִיכוֹת הֶכְשֵׁר שֵׁנִי. וְחָזַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לִהְיוֹת שׁוֹנֶה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

Rabbi Yehuda continues: I said before him: You taught us, our teacher, that in a case of endives that one picked and rinsed in water for the consumption of an animal, and one later reconsidered and decided to designate them for human consumption, the endives need to come into contact with liquid a second time in order to be rendered susceptible to impurity, as food designated for animal consumption does not contract impurity. Evidently, for a food item to become susceptible to impurity, its contact with liquid must occur after one designated it as food. And Rabbi Akiva then retracted his previous statement and taught the halakha in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

מָר סָבַר לַהּ כְּמֵעִיקָּרָא, וּמָר סָבַר לַהּ כַּחֲזָרָה.

Rav Pappa concludes: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree in the same manner. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds in accordance with that which Rabbi Akiva taught originally, and one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with that which Rabbi Akiva taught after his retraction of his original statement.

רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא אָמַר: בְּנִתְקַנֵּחַ הַדָּם בֵּין סִימָן לְסִימָן קָמִיפַּלְגִי.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said another explanation of the dispute: The mishna is discussing a case where the blood of slaughter came into contact with a partially severed limb, and the blood of slaughter is one of the liquids that render food susceptible to impurity. But slaughter is valid only if one cuts the two simanim, the windpipe and the gullet, or the majority of the two simanim, and the tanna’im disagree with regard to a case where the blood in question was wiped off between the cutting of the first siman and the second siman.

מָר סָבַר יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף, וְהַאי דַּם שְׁחִיטָה הוּא, וּמָר סָבַר אֵינָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה אֶלָּא לְסוֹף, וְהַאי דַּם מַכָּה הוּא.

One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that slaughter is defined from the beginning to the end of its performance, and this blood that splashed on the limb is considered blood of slaughter. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that slaughter is defined only as the conclusion of its performance, and this blood from the first siman is considered the blood of a wound and does not render the limb susceptible to impurity.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: בִּשְׁחִיטָה מַכְשֶׁרֶת וְלֹא דָּם קָמִיפַּלְגִי.

Rav Ashi said another explanation of the dispute: The case is where the blood of slaughter came in contact with the partially severed limb, but Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree with regard to the principle that the slaughter itself renders the limb susceptible to impurity, and not the blood of slaughter. Rabbi Shimon holds that the blood of slaughter is not one of the liquids that render food susceptible to impurity. But the slaughter itself renders the meat of the animal susceptible to impurity, because it prepares the meat for consumption. Therefore, since a partially severed limb is not prepared for consumption by the slaughter, as it remains forbidden, the slaughter does not render it susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Meir maintains that the blood of slaughter is one of the liquids that render food susceptible to impurity, and therefore, the limb is rendered susceptible.

בָּעֵי רַבָּה: בְּהֵמָה בְּחַיֶּיהָ, מַהוּ שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה יָד לְאֵבֶר? תֵּיקוּ.

new sugyaEarlier (127b), Rabba explained that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree with regard to whether the body of an animal constitutes a handle for its limb. With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that it does constitute a handle, Rabba raises a dilemma: What is the halakha if an animal with a partially severed limb came into contact with a source of impurity during its lifetime? In such a case, where the animal is not susceptible to contract impurity because it is alive but the partially severed limb is susceptible to contract impurity as food, does the animal constitute a handle for its limb and transmit the impurity to the limb? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ, קִישּׁוּת שֶׁנְּטָעָהּ בְּעָצִיץ וְהִגְדִּילָה וְיָצָאת חוּץ לֶעָצִיץ – טְהוֹרָה.

The Gemara introduces a similar dilemma. Abaye says: The Sages said in the mishna (Okatzin 2:9): In the case of an impure cucumber that one planted in an unperforated flowerpot, such that the cucumber is considered detached from the ground and susceptible to impurity as food, and the cucumber grew and went out beyond the edge of the flowerpot such that part of the cucumber is overlying the ground, the entire cucumber is considered attached to the ground and therefore becomes pure.

אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: וְכִי מָה טִיבָהּ לְטַהֵר? אֶלָּא הַטָּמֵא בְּטוּמְאָתוֹ, וְטָהוֹר בְּטׇהֳרָתוֹ.

Rabbi Shimon says: What is the nature of the impurity of the cucumber that it is rendered pure in such a case? Rather, the part of the cucumber that is inside the flowerpot and impure remains in its state of impurity, and the part of the cucumber that is outside the flowerpot and pure remains in its state of purity.

בָּעֵי אַבָּיֵי: מַהוּ שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה יָד לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ? תֵּיקוּ.

Based on this mishna, Abaye raises a dilemma according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: What is the halakha if the part of the cucumber outside of the flowerpot comes into contact with a source of impurity? Does the part of the cucumber outside the flowerpot constitute a handle for its counterpart inside the flowerpot and transmit impurity to it to it? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לַחֲצִי דַלַּעַת אֲסָרָהּ, בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה:

The Gemara relates another dilemma based on the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yirmeya says: The Sages said that one who bows down to a half of a gourd, worshipping it as a divinity, renders that half of the gourd forbidden, i.e., it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, because it was worshipped as an idol. The other half, though, is not forbidden. Based on this ruling, Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma:

מַהוּ שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה יָד לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ? תֵּיקוּ.

According to Rabbi Shimon, an item that is forbidden due to idol worship is not susceptible to impurity as food (see 129a). What is the halakha if the forbidden part of the gourd comes into contact with a source of impurity? Does the forbidden part constitute a handle for its permitted counterpart and transmit impurity to it? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ יִחוּר שֶׁל תְּאֵנָה שֶׁנִּפְשַׁח וּמְעוֹרֶה בִּקְלִיפָּתָהּ – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מְטַהֵר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אִם יָכוֹל לִחְיוֹת – טָהוֹר, וְאִם לָאו – טָמֵא.

The Gemara discusses a similar dilemma. Rav Pappa says: The Sages said in a mishna (Okatzin 3:8): In the case of a branch of a fig tree that was mainly detached from the tree and which remains attached only to the bark of the tree, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the figs on the branch are considered as if they are still attached to the tree. Therefore, he deems them not susceptible to impurity. And the Rabbis say: If one is able to reattach the branch to the tree such that the branch can continue to live and produce fruit, then it is considered as if it is attached to the tree and the fruit on it is not susceptible to impurity. But if not, then the fruit is susceptible to impurity.

בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא: מַהוּ שֶׁיֵּעָשֶׂה יָד לַחֲבֵירוֹ? תֵּיקוּ.

With regard to this mishna, Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: According to the Rabbis, who distinguish between a branch that can be reattached and one that cannot, what is the halakha in the case of a branch that is mainly detached from a tree but can be reattached, and a second branch grows out from that branch, and is mainly detached from it and cannot be reattached? In such a case, the branch that can be reattached to the tree is not susceptible to contracting impurity, but the branch attached to it is. If the branch that is not susceptible to contract impurity comes into contact with a source of impurity, does it constitute a handle for the other branch and transmit impurity to it? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא, הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ: אֶבֶן שֶׁבַּזָּוִית, כְּשֶׁהוּא חוֹלֵץ – חוֹלֵץ אֶת כּוּלָּהּ, וּכְשֶׁהוּא נוֹתֵץ – נוֹתֵץ אֶת שֶׁלּוֹ וּמַנִּיחַ אֶת שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ.

The Gemara discusses another similar dilemma. Rabbi Zeira says: The Sages said in a mishna (Nega’im 13:2): In the case of a large stone that is situated in the corner of a wall shared by two houses, where the stone is visible from inside both houses, if a leprous mark appears in one of the houses on the stone, when one extracts the stone he must extract the entire stone, even the part of the stone that is part of the neighbor’s wall. But when one destroys his house, after a reappearance of the leprous mark, he must destroy only the part of a stone that is in his house, and leaves the part of a stone that belongs to his neighbor.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי זֵירָא: מַהוּ שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה יָד לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ? תֵּיקוּ.

With regard to this mishna Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: What is the halakha in such a case with regard to the transmission of impurity from the leprous house to the adjacent house? Does half of the stone in the adjacent house constitute a handle for the other half and impart impurity such that one who enters the neighbor’s house becomes impure just as one who enters the leprous house? Or perhaps there is no halakha of a handle with regard to the impurity of a leprous house. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

מֵתָה הַבְּהֵמָה. מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי לְאֵבֶר (שֶׁל) [מִן] הַנְּבֵלָה?

new sugyaThe mishna teaches: If the animal died, the hanging flesh needs to be rendered susceptible to impurity via contact with a liquid in order to become impure, as its halakhic status is that of flesh severed from a living animal, which is ritually pure and does not have the status of an unslaughtered carcass. The hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from a living animal but does not impart impurity as the limb of an unslaughtered carcass. The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the impurity of a limb from a living animal and the impurity of a limb from a carcass?

אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ בָּשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ (מֵאֵבֶר בְּהֵמָה), דְּאִילּוּ בָּשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מֵאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי – לֹא מְטַמֵּא, מֵאֵבֶר מִן הַנְּבֵלָה – מְטַמֵּא.

The Gemara answers: The difference between them is with regard to flesh that separates from the limb of an animal, as flesh that separates from a limb severed from the living does not impart impurity, just like flesh that separates directly from a living animal. By contrast, an olive-bulk of flesh that separates from the limb of a carcass imparts impurity like the flesh of a carcass.

אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי דִּמְטַמֵּא, מַאי קְרָא? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: ״וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״.

The Gemara asks: What is the verse from which it is derived that a limb severed from the living imparts impurity? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to the impurity of a carcass it is written: “And if some animal [min habehema] of which you may eat dies, he who touches its carcass shall be impure until evening” (Leviticus 11:39). The phrase “some animal [min habehema],” which also means: From an animal, is interpreted as indicating that a limb torn from an animal is included in the impurity discussed in the verse.

וְהַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לִכְאִידַּךְ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ בְּמַתְנִיתָא תָּנָא: ״וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״ – מִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה מְטַמְּאָה, וּמִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה אֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה, וְאֵיזוֹ זוֹ? זוֹ טְרֵפָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ!

The Gemara asks: How can Rav interpret this verse in such a manner? This verse is necessary for another halakha that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, as Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and some say it was taught in a baraita: In the verse: “And if some animal [min habehema] of which you may eat dies, he who touches its carcass shall be impure until evening,” the phrase “some animal [min habehema]” indicates that some dead animals impart impurity as a carcass, and some dead animals do not impart impurity as a carcass. And which is that animal that does not impart impurity as a carcass? That is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa] that one slaughtered. Even though slaughter does not render the animal permitted to be eaten, it removes the animal from the category of a carcass with regard to impurity.

אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״מִבְּהֵמָה״, מַאי ״מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.

The Gemara answers: If so, if the verse teaches only one of the two halakhot, let the Merciful One write mibehema, in one Hebrew word. What is the verse teaching when it states: “Min habehema,” with two Hebrew words? It is teaching that one should conclude two conclusions from it.

אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ בָּשָׂר נָמֵי? לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל יְהֵא בָּשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִן הַחַי טָמֵא? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״ – מָה מִיתָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה חֲלִיפִין, אַף כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה חֲלִיפִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

The Gemara challenges: If so, if this verse teaches that a limb from a living animal imparts impurity, one can also derive from it that even flesh from a living animal imparts impurity. The Gemara responds: It should not enter your mind to derive this, as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that flesh that separates from a living animal is impure like a carcass. Therefore, the verse states: “And if some animal of which you may eat dies.” Just as death does not generate a replacement, i.e., life is not regenerated from the dead, so too any element of an animal that dies and does not generate a replacement assumes the impurity of a carcass. An animal does not replace a severed limb but it does replace severed flesh; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״בְּהֵמָה״, מָה בְּהֵמָה – גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת, אַף כֹּל – גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״בְּהֵמָה״ מָה בְּהֵמָה – בָּשָׂר גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת, אַף כֹּל – בָּשָׂר גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת.

Rabbi Akiva says: One can derive this halakha from the word “animal” in the verse. Just as an animal contains sinews and bones, so too, any element of an animal that contains sinews and bones imparts impurity. Therefore, a limb, which contains sinews and bones, imparts impurity, but flesh, which does not contain sinews and bones, does not impart impurity. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One can derive this halakha from the word “animal” in the verse. Just as an animal contains flesh, sinews, and bones, so too, any element of an animal that contains flesh, sinews, and bones imparts impurity.

מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין רַבִּי לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ אַרְכוּבָּה.

The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Akiva? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to the leg joint, which contains sinews and bones but no flesh. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi it does not impart impurity when it separates from a living animal, but according to Rabbi Akiva it does.

בֵּין רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כּוּלְיָא וְנִיב שְׂפָתַיִם אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara asks: What practical difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? Rav Pappa said: The practical difference between them is with regard to the kidney and the upper lip that separate from a living animal. According to Rabbi Yosei these parts of the animal impart impurity because the animal does not generate a replacement for them; according to Rabbi Akiva they do not impart impurity, because they do not contain bones.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי גַּבֵּי שְׁרָצִים כְּהַאי גַּוְונָא: יָכוֹל בָּשָׂר הַפּוֹרֵשׁ מִן הַשְּׁרָצִים יְהֵא טָמֵא? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בְּמוֹתָם״ – מָה מִיתָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה חֲלִיפִין, אַף כֹּל שֶׁאֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה חֲלִיפִין. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי.

The Gemara states a different halakha where these three tanna’im express the same opinions. So too, it is taught in a baraita with regard to creeping animals like this case: One might have thought that flesh that separates from a creeping animal during its lifetime should be impure like a creeping animal carcass. Therefore, the verse states with regard to creeping animal carcasses: “And upon whatever any of them falls when they are dead shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:32). The word “dead” teaches that just as death does not generate a replacement, so too any element of a creeping animal that dies and does not generate a replacement imparts the impurity of a creeping animal carcass, excluding flesh; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״שֶׁרֶץ״, מָה שֶׁרֶץ – גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת, אַף כֹּל – גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״שֶׁרֶץ״, מָה שֶׁרֶץ – בָּשָׂר גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת, אַף כֹּל – בָּשָׂר גִּידִים וַעֲצָמוֹת.

Rabbi Akiva says: One can derive this halakha from the term “creeping animal.” Just as a creeping animal contains sinews and bones, so too any element of a creeping animal that contains sinews and bones imparts impurity. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One can derive this halakha from the term “creeping animal.” Just as a creeping animal contains flesh, sinews, and bones, so too, any element of a creeping animal that contains flesh, sinews, and bones imparts impurity.

בֵּין רַבִּי לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ אַרְכוּבָּה. בֵּין רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כּוּלְיָא וְנִיב שְׂפָתַיִם אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara comments: The practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Akiva is with regard to the leg joint, which contains sinews and bones but no flesh. What difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? Rav Pappa said: The practical difference between them is with regard to the kidney and the upper lip, which contain no bones and which are not regenerated by the creeping animal.

וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּהֵמָה – הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּלֹא מְטַמֵּא מֵחַיִּים, מִשּׁוּם דְּלֹא מְטַמֵּא בְּכַעֲדָשָׁה, אֲבָל שֶׁרֶץ דִּמְטַמֵּא בְּכַעֲדָשָׁה – אֵימָא לְטַמֵּא מֵחַיִּים.

And it is necessary to teach this halakha both with regard to flesh that separates from a living animal and with regard to flesh that separates from a creeping animal. As if the baraita had taught us this halakha only with regard to an animal, one might have said that this is the reason that flesh that separates from a living animal does not impart impurity: It is because an animal carcass does not impart impurity in the measure of a lentil-bulk, but rather only in the measure of an olive-bulk. But with regard to a creeping animal, which imparts impurity even in the measure of a lentil-bulk, say that flesh that separates from it while it is living should impart impurity.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְועִינַן שֶׁרֶץ, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא מְטַמֵּא בְּמַשָּׂא – לֹא מְטַמֵּא מֵחַיִּים, אֲבָל בְּהֵמָה, דִּמְטַמֵּא בְּמַשָּׂא – אֵימָא תְּטַמֵּא מֵחַיִּים, צְרִיכָא.

And if the baraita had taught us this halakha only with regard to a creeping animal, one might have said that flesh that separates from a creeping animal does not impart impurity because a creeping animal does not impart impurity via carrying, and therefore flesh that separates from it while it is living does not impart impurity. But with regard to an animal, which imparts impurity via carrying, say that flesh that separates from it while it is living should impart impurity. Therefore, it is necessary to teach this halakha in both cases.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַחוֹתֵךְ כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר מֵאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי, חֲתָכוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִישֵּׁב עָלָיו – טָהוֹר.

new sugyaThe Gemara continues to discuss flesh that separates from a living animal. The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of one who severs an olive-bulk of flesh from a limb severed from the living, the flesh does not impart the impurity of a carcass but it does impart impurity as food if one designated it as food before it came into contact with a source of impurity. Therefore, if one severed the flesh from the limb and afterward intended it to be used for the consumption of a gentile, the flesh remains pure because at the time he designated the flesh as food it was not in contact with a source of impurity.

חִישֵּׁב עָלָיו, וְאַחַר כָּךְ חֲתָכוֹ – טָמֵא.

But if he intended it to be used for the consumption of a gentile and afterward severed the flesh, the flesh is impure, because it came into contact with a source of impurity, i.e., the limb, after it was designated as food.

רַבִּי אַסִּי לָא עָל לְבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא, אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַבִּי זֵירָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי אֲמוּר בְּבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי קַשְׁיָא לָךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, דְּקָתָנֵי: חִישֵּׁב וְאַחַר כָּךְ חֲתָכוֹ טָמֵא.

One day Rabbi Asi did not go to the study hall. He found Rabbi Zeira, and said to him: What was said today in the study hall? Rabbi Zeira said to him: What matter is difficult for you that you think may have been discussed in the study hall? Rabbi Asi said to him: I find difficult that which is taught in a baraita: If one intended flesh from a limb that was severed from a living animal to be used for the consumption of a gentile, and afterward he severed the flesh from the limb, the flesh is impure.