Chapter 7: Gid HaNasheh (the sciatic nerve) · Mon, 10 August 2026Capítulo 7: Guid HaNashé (el nervio sciático) · lun, 10 de agosto de 2026
⚠️AI-generated study aid, built from the text of the daf. It does not replace learning the daf itself.Hoja generada por IA a partir del texto del daf. No reemplaza el estudio del daf mismo.דף עזר ללימוד שנוצר בבינה מלאכותית מתוך טקסט הדף. אינו מחליף את לימוד הדף עצמו.
📜 This is the daf itself — the Vilna page, not our writing. It is not AI-generated.Este es el daf mismo — la página de Vilna, no nuestra redacción. No está generado por IA.זהו הדף עצמו — דף וילנא, ולא כתיבה שלנו. הוא אינו מיוצר בבינה מלאכותית.
הדף הזה עדיין לא תורגם לעברית; למטה מופיעה הגרסה האנגלית.
The big picture (read this first)
Yesterday closed on a new prohibition — אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי, the limb of a living animal — and the
observation that its two camps read one and the same verse. Today the whole daf is a survey of that
one prohibition, walking its boundary in four directions at once: which species it covers,
how much you must eat to be flogged, whose intention counts, and which verse it comes
from.
The prohibition of eating from the living is not one law but a small family of them: a limb
torn from the living, flesh torn from the living, and flesh of a tereifa. Each amud asks where
one ends and the next begins — and the answers keep turning on a single strange question about
the animal itself: while it is still alive, does it already stand divided into its limbs?
Four movements:
Which species (102a) — non-kosher or only kosher, domesticated or also bird; and the crucial
split between what binds a Jew and what binds a descendant of Noah.
How much (102a–102b) — Rav’s rule that a limb, too, needs an olive-bulk, and the mishnah that
seems to forbid any amount, rescued by counting sinew and bone.
Whose intention (102b) — Rava’s twin im timtzi lomar: could a person’s private thought
about how he means to eat change whether he is liable?
Which verse (102b) — Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish divide two verses between limb, flesh,
and tereifa, and it decides how many sets of lashes you earn.
Key concepts & terms
Term
Meaning
אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי(ever min hachai)
A limb — flesh, sinew and bone together — severed from a living animal and eaten. The prohibition surveyed all daf.
כֹּל שֶׁאַתָּה מְצֻוֶּה עַל דָּמוֹ(kol she’atah metzuveh al damo)
“Any animal whose blood you are commanded about”: Rabbi Elazar’s reading, extending ever min hachai to non-kosher species.
בָּשָׂר לְחוֹדֵיהּ(basar lechudeih)
“The flesh alone”: the Rabbis’ reading, confining the prohibition to species whose flesh can become permitted.
“Thought about food is [significant] thought” — the premise of Rava’s twin cases.
זֶה לְפִי מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ(zeh lefi machshavto)
“Each according to his own thought” — the same act can be liable for one person and not another.
בָּשָׂר מִן הַחַי / בְּשַׂר טְרֵפָה(basar min hachai / besar tereifa)
Flesh (less than a whole limb) torn from the living / flesh of a tereifa — the two neighbours whose verses Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish divide differently.
El panorama general (leer esto primero)
Ayer cerró con una prohibición nueva — אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי, el miembro de un animal vivo — y la
observación de que sus dos bandos leen uno y el mismo versículo. Hoy todo el daf es un recorrido de
esa única prohibición, caminando su frontera en cuatro direcciones a la vez: qué especies
abarca, cuánto hay que comer para recibir azotes, de quién es la intención que cuenta, y de
qué versículo proviene.
La prohibición de comer de lo vivo no es una sola ley sino una pequeña familia de ellas: un
miembro arrancado de lo vivo, carne arrancada de lo vivo, y carne de un taref. Cada amud
pregunta dónde termina una y empieza la siguiente — y las respuestas siguen girando en torno a
una única pregunta extraña sobre el animal mismo: mientras aún vive, ¿ya se sostiene dividido en
sus miembros?
Cuatro movimientos:
Qué especies (102a) — no kosher o solo kosher, doméstico o también ave; y la división crucial
entre lo que obliga a un judío y lo que obliga a un descendiente de Nóaj.
Cuánto (102a–102b) — la regla de Rav de que un miembro también necesita un volumen de
aceituna, y la mishná que parece prohibir cualquier cantidad, rescatada contando nervio y hueso.
De quién es la intención (102b) — el doble im timtzé lomar de Rava: ¿podría el pensamiento
privado de una persona sobre cómo piensa comer cambiar si es responsable?
Qué versículo (102b) — Rabí Iojanán y Reish Lakish reparten dos versículos entre miembro,
carne y taref, y ello decide cuántas series de azotes te ganas.
Conceptos y términos clave
Término
Significado
אֵבֶר מִן הַחַי(éver min hajai)
Un miembro — carne, nervio y hueso juntos — cortado de un animal vivo y comido. La prohibición recorrida todo el daf.
כֹּל שֶׁאַתָּה מְצֻוֶּה עַל דָּמוֹ(kol sheatá metzuvé al damó)
“Todo animal sobre cuya sangre estás mandado”: la lectura de Rabí Elazar, que extiende el éver min hajai a las especies no kosher.
בָּשָׂר לְחוֹדֵיהּ(basar lejudeih)
“La carne sola”: la lectura de los Sabios, que confina la prohibición a especies cuya carne puede llegar a permitirse.
La prohibición obliga también a los descendientes de Nóaj — su estrictez añadida, y el único punto en que todos concuerdan en que abarca especies no kosher.
Un volumen de aceituna hecho de una traza de carne más nervios y huesos — cómo un miembro alcanza la medida sin un volumen de aceituna de carne comestible.
קְלָנִיתָא(kelanita)
Un ave diminuta y esmirriada — el caso de un cuerpo sin un volumen de aceituna de carne pero con un miembro que lo alcanza con nervio y hueso.
“El pensamiento sobre la comida es pensamiento [significativo]” — la premisa de los dos casos de Rava.
זֶה לְפִי מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ(ze lefí majshavtó)
“Cada uno según su propio pensamiento” — el mismo acto puede ser responsable para una persona y no para otra.
בָּשָׂר מִן הַחַי / בְּשַׂר טְרֵפָה(basar min hajai / besar taref)
Carne (menos que un miembro entero) arrancada de lo vivo / carne de un taref — los dos vecinos cuyos versículos Rabí Iojanán y Reish Lakish reparten de modo distinto.
🃏 FlashcardsTarjetasכרטיסיות
The terms above, one per card. Read the term, recall what it means on this daf, then turn the card over and say whether you had it. Whatever you flag comes back at the end in a shorter second round.Los términos de arriba, uno por tarjeta. Lee el término, recuerda qué significa en este daf, luego gira la tarjeta y di si lo sabías. Lo que marques vuelve al final en una segunda ronda, más corta.המונחים שלמעלה, אחד לכל כרטיס. קראו את המונח, נסו להיזכר מה משמעותו בדף הזה, ואז הפכו את הכרטיס ואמרו אם ידעתם. כל מה שתסמנו יחזור בסוף בסיבוב שני, קצר יותר.
Tip: click the card, then space flips it, ← → move, 1 / 2 rate it.Consejo: pulsa en la tarjeta; la barra espaciadora la gira, ← → navegan, 1 / 2 califican.טיפ: הקישו על הכרטיס; מקש הרווח הופך אותו, ← → מדפדפים, 1 / 2 מדרגים.
Who’s who in today’s daf
Tannaim
Rabbi Yehuda (bar Ilai) — fourth generation, student of Rabbi Akiva. Holds issur chal al
issur, so he needs no verse to extend ever min hachai to non-kosher species.
Rabbi Elazar (ben Shammua) — fourth generation, student of Rabbi Akiva. The one for whom the
verse is truly needed; the daf reassigns the derivation to him. Not the Amora Rabbi Elazar ben
Pedat, and not Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon below.
Rabbi Meir — fourth generation, student of Rabbi Akiva. Limits ever min hachai to a kosher
domesticated animal.
The Rabbis (chachamim) — confine the prohibition to kosher species, including birds and wild
animals.
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (Rebbi) — fifth generation, redactor of the Mishnah. Exempts for a whole
live bird under an olive-bulk: in life it is not yet divided into limbs.
Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon — fifth generation, son of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. Holds one
liable by kal vachomer: in life it already stands divided into limbs. (Not Rabbi Elazar ben
Shammua above.)
Eretz-Yisrael Amoraim
Rabbi Yochanan (bar Nappacha) — second generation, head of Tiberias. Assigns ever min hachai
and tereifa/flesh to two separate verses.
Reish Lakish (Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish) — second generation, Tiberias; Rabbi Yochanan’s
brother-in-law and great disputant. Divides the same two verses the other way.
Rabbi Mani bar Pattish — a later Eretz-Yisrael figure; resolves the Teharot mishnah as Jew
versus Noahide. Beyond that I would not press his biography.
Babylonian Amoraim
Rav (Abba Arikha) — first generation, founder of Sura. Requires an olive-bulk for a limb, and
the source of the graded shiurim for kosher and non-kosher birds.
Rav Giddel — second/third generation, a faithful transmitter of Rav’s rulings. Reports that
all agree a descendant of Noah is bound regarding non-kosher species.
Rabba bar Shmuel / bar Sheila / bar Shimi — the uncertain name (hence the mnemonic) behind
Rabbi Meir’s reason; reported from Rav Chisda or Rav Yosef.
Rav Chisda — third generation, Sura. Rav Yosef — third generation, Pumbedita. Cited as the
two possible sources of that same teaching.
Rav Amram — third generation, Nehardea/Pumbedita; a student of Rav Sheshet. Objects that the
Teharot mishnah already implies an olive-bulk.
Rav Nachman (bar Yaakov) — third generation, Nehardea. Supplies “a trace of meat with sinews
and bones.”
Rav Sheizvi and Rav Sherevya — later Babylonian amoraim of the school; the first brings
the Teharot proof, the second the kelanita. Both comparatively minor; I would not guess
further at their generations.
Rava — fourth generation, Machoza. The twin im timtzi lomar on thought and food.
Abaye — fourth generation, head of Pumbedita; Rava’s lifelong disputant. Presses the “same act,
different person” objection both times.
Look-alikes worth flagging: three men named Elazar are in play — Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua
(Tanna, paired with Rabbi Yehuda), Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon (Tanna, the kal vachomer), and
the Amora Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat (not on this daf). Rabba bar Shmuel/Sheila/Shimi is a
transmitter, not Rabbah the head of Pumbedita. And Rabbi Yehuda the Tanna is not Rav
Yehuda the Amora.
Quién es quién en el daf de hoy
Tanaím
Rabí Iehudá (bar Ilai) — cuarta generación, alumno de Rabí Akivá. Sostiene isur jal al isur,
así que no necesita versículo para extender el éver min hajai a las especies no kosher.
Rabí Elazar (ben Shamúa) — cuarta generación, alumno de Rabí Akivá. Aquel para quien el
versículo realmente hace falta; el daf le reasigna la derivación. No es el amorá Rabí Elazar ben
Pedat, ni Rabí Elazar bar Rabí Shimón, más abajo.
Rabí Meir — cuarta generación, alumno de Rabí Akivá. Limita el éver min hajai a un animal
doméstico kosher.
Los Sabios (jajamim) — confinan la prohibición a especies kosher, incluidas aves y animales
salvajes.
Rabí Iehudá HaNasí (Rebbi) — quinta generación, redactor de la Mishná. Exime por un ave viva
entera menor que un volumen de aceituna: en vida aún no está dividida en miembros.
Rabí Elazar bar Rabí Shimón — quinta generación, hijo de Rabí Shimón bar Iojái. Hace
responsable por kal vajómer: en vida ya se sostiene dividida en miembros. (No es Rabí Elazar ben
Shamúa, más arriba.)
Amoraím de Erretz Israel
Rabí Iojanán (bar Napajá) — segunda generación, cabeza de Tiberias. Asigna el éver min hajai
y el taref/carne a dos versículos separados.
Reish Lakish (Rabí Shimón ben Lakish) — segunda generación, Tiberias; cuñado y gran
contrincante de Rabí Iojanán. Reparte los mismos dos versículos al revés.
Rabí Maní bar Patish — una figura posterior de Erretz Israel; resuelve la mishná de Teharot
como judío contra noájida. Más allá de eso no querría forzar su biografía.
Amoraím de Babilonia
Rav (Aba Arijá) — primera generación, fundador de Sura. Requiere un volumen de aceituna para
un miembro, y es la fuente de las medidas graduadas para aves kosher y no kosher.
Rav Guidel — segunda/tercera generación, fiel transmisor de los dictámenes de Rav. Informa que
todos concuerdan en que un descendiente de Nóaj está obligado respecto de las especies no kosher.
Rabá bar Shmuel / bar Sheila / bar Shimi — el nombre incierto (de ahí el mnemónico) detrás de
la razón de Rabí Meir; transmitido de Rav Jisda o Rav Iosef.
Rav Jisda — tercera generación, Sura. Rav Iosef — tercera generación, Pumbedita. Citados
como las dos posibles fuentes de esa misma enseñanza.
Rav Amram — tercera generación, Nehardea/Pumbedita; alumno de Rav Sheshet. Objeta que la
mishná de Teharot ya implica un volumen de aceituna.
Rav Najmán (bar Iaakov) — tercera generación, Nehardea. Aporta “una traza de carne con nervios
y huesos”.
Rav Sheizvi y Rav Sherevia — amoraím babilonios posteriores de la academia; el primero
trae la prueba de Teharot, el segundo la kelanita. Ambos comparativamente menores; no querría
aventurar más sus generaciones.
Rava — cuarta generación, Majoza. Los dos im timtzé lomar sobre el pensamiento y la comida.
Abaie — cuarta generación, cabeza de Pumbedita; contrincante de toda la vida de Rava. Presiona
la objeción de “mismo acto, distinta persona” las dos veces.
Parecidos que vale señalar: hay tres hombres llamados Elazar en juego — Rabí Elazar ben
Shamúa (tana, emparejado con Rabí Iehudá), Rabí Elazar bar Rabí Shimón (tana, el del kal
vajómer), y el amorá Rabí Elazar ben Pedat (no en este daf). Rabá bar Shmuel/Sheila/Shimi es
un transmisor, no Rabá el jefe de Pumbedita. Y Rabí Iehudá el tana no es Rav Iehudá el
amorá.
The whole Vilna page as it is printed — Gemara in the middle, Rashi and Tosafot in the margins, Mesoras HaShas and Ein Mishpat down the sides. Open it full size to read it comfortably, and tap any line underneath it for the English of that passage.La página de Vilna completa, tal como está impresa — la Guemará en el centro, Rashi y Tosafot en los márgenes, Masoret HaShas y Ein Mishpat a los lados. Ábrela a tamaño completo para leerla con comodidad; debajo está su texto, pasaje por pasaje.דף וילנא כולו כפי שהוא מודפס — הגמרא באמצע, רש״י ותוספות בשוליים, מסורת הש״ס ועין משפט בצדדים. פתחו אותו בגודל מלא כדי לקרוא בנוחות; מתחתיו מופיע הטקסט שלו, קטע אחר קטע.
Line by line — tap one for its EnglishEl texto de la página, pasaje por pasajeטקסט הדף, קטע אחר קטע
and you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23). Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar hold that with regard to any animal whose blood you are commanded not to eat, you are commanded with regard to its limbs, i.e., you are prohibited from eating its limbs that were severed while it was still alive. Consequently, with regard to these non-kosher species also, since you are commanded not to eat their blood, you are commanded with regard to their limbs.
And the Rabbis hold that the verse indicates: “And you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23), but rather you shall eat the flesh alone, i.e., when the animal is no longer alive. Consequently, with regard to any animal whose flesh is permitted when it is slaughtered, you are commanded with regard to its limbs, i.e., you are prohibited from eating its limbs that were severed while it was still alive. But with regard to any animal whose flesh is not permitted when it is slaughtered, you are not commanded with regard to its limbs, i.e., the prohibition of eating limbs that were severed while it was still alive does not apply.
The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a prohibition takes effect upon an already existing, less stringent prohibition, why does he need to derive this from a verse? Let the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal come and take effect on the prohibition of eating meat from a non-kosher animal, as it is more stringent since its prohibition applies also to descendants of Noah, i.e., gentiles.
The Gemara responds: Yes, that is indeed so. Rabbi Yehuda does not need to derive this halakha from a verse, and the verse was necessary only according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who holds that a prohibition does not take effect where there is an already existing prohibition, even if the second prohibition is more stringent.
This fact that it is Rabbi Elazar who derives this halakha from the verse, as opposed to Rabbi Yehuda, is also taught in a baraita: The prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal applies with regard to a limb from a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird, and whether it is from a non-kosher species or a kosher species, as it is stated: “Only be steadfast in not eating the blood, for the blood is the life; and you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23).
This verse indicates that with regard to any species whose blood you are commanded not to eat, you are commanded with regard to its limbs, i.e., you are prohibited from eating its limbs that were severed while it was still alive. And any species about whose blood you are not commanded, i.e., with regard to which the prohibition of eating blood does not apply, you are not commanded with regard to their limbs. Since the prohibition of eating blood applies even with regard to non-kosher species, the prohibition of eating limbs severed from a living animal also applies; this is the statement of Rabbi Elazar.
And the Rabbis say: The prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal applies only to kosher species, as it is stated in the verse: “And you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23), but rather you shall eat the flesh alone, i.e., when the animal is no longer alive. Consequently, with regard to any animal whose flesh is permitted when it is slaughtered, you are commanded with regard to its limbs, i.e., you are prohibited from eating its limbs that were severed while it was still alive. But with regard to any animal whose flesh is not permitted when it is slaughtered, you are not commanded with regard to its limbs, i.e., the prohibition of eating limbs that were severed while it was still alive does not apply.
Rabbi Meir says that the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal applies only with regard to a kosher species of domesticated animal, but not with regard to undomesticated animals or fowl, even if they are kosher.
The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the different opinions with regard to the name of one of the Sages cited in the upcoming discussion: Shmuel, Sheila, Shimi.
Rabba bar Shmuel said that Rav Ḥisda said, and some say that it was Rav Yosef who said the following statement. And some say the attributions as follows: Rabba bar Sheila said that Rav Ḥisda said, and some say that it was Rav Yosef who said; and some say the attributions as follows: Rabba bar Shimi said that Rav Ḥisda said, and some say that it was Rav Yosef who said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir that the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal applies only with regard to a kosher species of domesticated animal?
It is that the verse states: “Then you shall slaughter of your cattle and of your sheep” (Deuteronomy 12:21). This verse is closely followed by the verse that serves as the source of the prohibition to eat a limb severed from a living animal (Deuteronomy 12:23), indicating that the prohibition applies only to kosher domesticated animals.
Rav Giddel says that Rav says: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Eliezer about whether the prohibition of eating a limb severed from a living animal applies with regard to non-kosher species is only with regard to Jews. But with regard to descendants of Noah, i.e., gentiles, everyone agrees that they are prohibited from eating a limb from a living non-kosher species of animal just like they are prohibited from eating a limb from a living kosher species.
The Gemara comments that this is also taught in a baraita: A descendant of Noah is prohibited from eating a limb from a living animal from non-kosher species just as from kosher species. But a Jew is prohibited from eating a limb from a living animal of kosher species only.
There are those who say that the correct wording of the baraita is that a Jew is prohibited from eating a limb from a living kosher species, in singular, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the prohibition is limited to kosher domestic animals. And there are those who say that the correct wording of the baraita is that a Jew is prohibited from eating a limb from living kosher species, in plural, and it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that the prohibition also applies to a limb from a living bird or a living undomesticated animal of kosher species.
Rav Sheizvi said: We learn in the mishna as well that a gentile is prohibited from eating a limb from a living being even with regard to non-kosher species (Teharot 1:3): If one ate a limb severed from a living non-kosher bird, he does not incur forty lashes, and slaughter does not purify it, i.e., cause it to become permitted for consumption.
Rav Sheizvi clarifies: With regard to what case does the mishna issue this ruling? If we say that it is referring to a Jew who ate the limb, it is obvious that slaughter does not purify it, because it is a non-kosher species and cannot be made kosher. Rather is it not referring to descendants of Noah and teaching that even after the bird is slaughtered the limb severed while it was alive remains forbidden? By inference, it is clear from the mishna that it is prohibited for a gentile to eat a limb severed from a living being even from a non-kosher species.
Rabbi Mani bar Pattish raises a contradiction between the first clause of that mishna, which states that one does not receive lashes for eating a limb severed from a living non-kosher bird, and the latter clause of the mishna, which states that a limb severed from a living non-kosher bird remains forbidden after the bird is slaughtered. The first clause indicates that the prohibition of eating a limb severed from a living creature applies only to kosher species, while the latter clause indicates that it applies also to non-kosher species. And he answers this contradiction by explaining that the first clause is referring to a Jew and the latter clause is referring to a descendant of Noah.
new sugyaThe Gemara continues discussing the prohibition of eating a limb severed from a living creature. Rav says: A limb severed from a living animal requires an olive-bulk in order to render one who eats it liable to receive lashes. What is the reason for this? It is because the term: Eating, is written with regard to the prohibition of a limb severed from a living animal, and the definition of eating is the consumption of at least one olive-bulk.
Rav Amram raises an objection from the mishna cited above (Teharot 1:3): If one ate a limb severed from a living non-kosher bird, he does not incur the forty lashes, and slaughter does not purify it, i.e., cause it to become permitted. But if it enters your mind that we require an olive-bulk in order for one to receive lashes for eating a limb severed from a living creature, that mishna must be referring to such a case; therefore, it should emerge that he is liable to receive lashes because he ate an olive-bulk of a non-kosher bird.
The Gemara answers: This can be explained as Rav Naḥman said with regard to another issue, that it is referring to a case of eating a small amount of meat together with sinews and bones and the total volume is an olive-bulk. Here also, the mishna is referring to a case of eating a small amount of meat together with sinews and bones.
The Gemara raises another challenge to Rav’s statement that one receives lashes for eating a limb severed from a living animal only if he eats an olive-bulk: Come and hear a proof in this regard, as Rav said:
Line by line — tap one for its EnglishEl texto de la página, pasaje por pasajeטקסט הדף, קטע אחר קטע
If one ate a kosher bird alive, one is punished with lashes for any amount, i.e., even if he ate less than an olive-bulk. If the bird was dead and was not ritually slaughtered, one is punished with lashes only if he ate an olive-bulk. And if one ate a whole bird of a non-kosher species, whether he ate it when it was alive or dead, he is punished with lashes for any amount, i.e., even if the bird contained less than an olive-bulk of meat. The Gemara answers: Here also explain that Rav’s statement is referring to a case of eating a small amount of meat along with sinews and bones, and the total volume is an olive-bulk.
Come and hear another challenge based upon a baraita: With regard to one who took a live bird of a kosher species that did not have a volume of an olive-bulk and ate it, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi exempts him from lashes and Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon deems him liable for lashes. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: He should be liable based upon an a fortiori inference: If one is liable to receive lashes for eating a limb of a living animal, all the more so is it not clear that one is liable to receive lashes for eating all of it? The baraita concludes: With regard to one who strangled the bird and ate it, everyone agrees that he is liable to receive lashes only if it had the volume of an olive-bulk.
The Gemara analyzes the baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, disagree only with regard to one who ate an entire live bird, as one Sage, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that even during its life all creatures stand to be divided into limbs, i.e., they will ultimately be cut into pieces. Consequently, each of its limbs is considered a separate entity, and even if one eats a limb without first separating it from the rest of the body, one violates the prohibition of eating a limb from a living being. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that during its life it does not stand to be divided into limbs. Therefore, one does not violate the prohibition of eating a limb from a living being unless he severs a limb from the body.
But in any event, everyone agrees that we do not require one to eat an olive-bulk of meat in order to be liable for lashes for eating a limb from a living being, which is the basis of the a fortiori inference of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Naḥman says in response: Explain that the baraita is referring to a case where one ate a small amount of meat together with sinews and bones, making a total of an olive-bulk.
The Gemara challenges this answer: But is there any bird that does not have an olive-bulk of meat in its whole body, but in one limb it has an olive-bulk of the combination of a small amount of meat together with sinews and bones? Rav Sherevya said: Yes, this is the case with regard to the kelanita, a bird that is very small and scrawny.
The Gemara challenges this answer that the baraita is referring to a kelanita. Say the latter clause: With regard to one who strangled the bird and ate it, everyone agrees that he is liable to receive lashes only if it had the volume of an olive-bulk. But a kelanita is a non-kosher bird, and Rav says: If one eats a whole non-kosher bird, whether he eats it when it is alive or dead, he is punished with lashes for eating any amount. The Gemara answers: The baraita is not referring to an actual kelanita, but rather to a kosher species of bird similar to a kelanita in that it is small and scrawny.
new sugyaThe Gemara above cited a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, with regard to one who eats an entire live kosher bird that is less than an olive-bulk. With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that an entire bird is not considered to be a limb and is therefore not included in the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal, Rava said: If you say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that thought with regard to food is considered thought, i.e., one’s thoughts have halakhic significance in determining a food’s status, then in a case where one thought to eat the bird limb by limb, and instead ate it all at once, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would hold that he is liable for transgressing the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal.
Abaye said to Rava: But is there anything with regard to which if another person ate it he would not be liable, but if this person ate it he is liable? Rava said to Abaye: There can be different outcomes for different people who perform the same act, as this individual’s action is judged according to his thought and that individual’s action is judged according to his thought.
And Rava also said: If you say that Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon holds that thought with regard to food is considered thought, then in a case where one at first intended to eat the entire bird after it had died, but ultimately he ate it alive, Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon would hold that he is exempt from lashes, as according to his thought it does not stand to be divided into limbs while alive.
Abaye said to Rava: But is there anything that if another person ate it he would be liable, but if this person ate it he is exempt? Rava said to Abaye: This individual’s action is judged according to his thought and that individual’s action is judged according to his thought.
new sugyaThe Gemara discusses the source of the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: “You shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23); this is the source for the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal. And the verse: “And you shall not eat any flesh that is torn in the field” (Exodus 22:30); this is the source for the prohibition of eating flesh severed from the living and flesh severed from a tereifa, even if it is not an entire limb.
And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: “You shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23); this is the source for the prohibitions of eating a limb from a living animal and of eating flesh severed from the living. And the verse: “And you shall not eat any flesh that is torn in the field” (Exodus 22:30); this is the source for the prohibition of eating flesh severed from a tereifa.
The Gemara clarifies the difference between these two opinions. If one ate a limb from a living animal and flesh severed from the living, then according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan he is liable to receive two sets of lashes but according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish he is liable to receive only one set of lashes. Conversely, if one ate flesh severed from the living and flesh severed from a tereifa, then according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish he is liable to receive two sets of lashes but according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan he is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If one ate a limb from a living animal and flesh severed from a tereifa, everyone agrees that he is liable to receive two sets of lashes.
And the Gemara raises a contradiction to the claim that everyone agrees that one who eats both a limb from a living animal and flesh severed from a tereifa is liable to receive two sets of lashes, based upon the following statement:
The daf laid out as it is printed: the Gemara in the middle, Rashi on the inner margin and Tosafot on the outer one. Nothing here was written by us.El daf con la disposición de la página impresa: la Guemará en el centro, Rashi en el margen interior y Tosafot en el exterior. Nada de esto fue escrito por nosotros.הדף בעימוד שבו הוא מודפס: הגמרא באמצע, רש״י בשוליים הפנימיים ותוספות בחיצוניים. שום דבר כאן לא נכתב על ידינו.
and you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23). Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar hold that with regard to any animal whose blood you are commanded not to eat, you are commanded with regard to its limbs, i.e., you are prohibited from eating its limbs that were severed while it was still alive. Consequently, with regard to these non-kosher species also, since you are commanded not to eat their blood, you are commanded with regard to their limbs.
לא תאכל הנפש עם הבשר — לא תאכל ממנו בעוד שהנפש עמו וזו היא אזהרה לאבר מן החי:
טמאין אתה מצווה על דמן — בכריתות בפרק דם שחיטה (כריתות דף כא.) לא יצאו מכלל אזהרתו אלא שרצים ודגים וחגבים ומהלכי שתים:
And the Rabbis hold that the verse indicates: “And you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23), but rather you shall eat the flesh alone, i.e., when the animal is no longer alive. Consequently, with regard to any animal whose flesh is permitted when it is slaughtered, you are commanded with regard to its limbs, i.e., you are prohibited from eating its limbs that were severed while it was still alive. But with regard to any animal whose flesh is not permitted when it is slaughtered, you are not commanded with regard to its limbs, i.e., the prohibition of eating limbs that were severed while it was still alive does not apply.
לא תאכל הנפש עם הבשר — משמע הא אין דם הנפש עמו אכול:
ורבי יהודה למה ליה קרא ליתי איסור אבר מן החי וליחול אאיסור טומאה שכן איסורו נוהג בבני נח — פי' כדשמעינן ליה לעיל (חולין דף ק:) גבי גיד דמההוא טעמא חייל אאיסור טומאה וא"ת ודילמא מהכא יליף וי"ל דלא מצי למילף מהכא דאיסור מוסיף הוא דאיתוסף ביה איסור אבר מן החי לבני נח אבל גיד לא נאסר אלא לבני יעקב ולא הוי אלא איסור חמור:
The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a prohibition takes effect upon an already existing, less stringent prohibition, why does he need to derive this from a verse? Let the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal come and take effect on the prohibition of eating meat from a non-kosher animal, as it is more stringent since its prohibition applies also to descendants of Noah, i.e., gentiles.
שכן איסורו נוהג בבני נח — שאף הם הוזהרו עליו דכתיב (בראשית ט) אך בשר בנפשו דמו וגו' ור' יהודה הא שמעינן ליה גבי גיד לעיל (חולין דף ק:) דמשום האי טעמא חייל אטמאה שכן איסורו נוהג בבני נח:
כי איצטריך לר' אלעזר — וא"ת אי קסבר בהמה בחייה לאברים עומדת אם כן איסור בת אחת היא ואפי' למאן דלית ליה בחמור על קל מודה וי"ל דאיסור טומאה קדים בעוד שלא נקשרו אברים בגידים:
The Gemara responds: Yes, that is indeed so. Rabbi Yehuda does not need to derive this halakha from a verse, and the verse was necessary only according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who holds that a prohibition does not take effect where there is an already existing prohibition, even if the second prohibition is more stringent.
כי איצטריך קרא — לאסרו לר' אלעזר איצטריך דאסר ליה בטמאה כר' יהודה ולית ליה איסור חל על איסור באיסור חמור אי לאו דכתביה קרא:
This fact that it is Rabbi Elazar who derives this halakha from the verse, as opposed to Rabbi Yehuda, is also taught in a baraita: The prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal applies with regard to a limb from a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird, and whether it is from a non-kosher species or a kosher species, as it is stated: “Only be steadfast in not eating the blood, for the blood is the life; and you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23).
תניא נמי הכי — כר' יוחנן דרבי אלעזר ורבנן מהאי קרא ילפי:
This verse indicates that with regard to any species whose blood you are commanded not to eat, you are commanded with regard to its limbs, i.e., you are prohibited from eating its limbs that were severed while it was still alive. And any species about whose blood you are not commanded, i.e., with regard to which the prohibition of eating blood does not apply, you are not commanded with regard to their limbs. Since the prohibition of eating blood applies even with regard to non-kosher species, the prohibition of eating limbs severed from a living animal also applies; this is the statement of Rabbi Elazar.
And the Rabbis say: The prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal applies only to kosher species, as it is stated in the verse: “And you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23), but rather you shall eat the flesh alone, i.e., when the animal is no longer alive. Consequently, with regard to any animal whose flesh is permitted when it is slaughtered, you are commanded with regard to its limbs, i.e., you are prohibited from eating its limbs that were severed while it was still alive. But with regard to any animal whose flesh is not permitted when it is slaughtered, you are not commanded with regard to its limbs, i.e., the prohibition of eating limbs that were severed while it was still alive does not apply.
ורבי מאיר אומר אינו נוהג אלא בבהמה טהורה בלבד — הקשה רבינו אפרים דתנן בריש מסכת טהרות י"ג דברים נאמרו בנבלת עוף טהור כו' והאוכל אבר מן החי ממנה סופג את הארבעים ומליקתה ושחיטתה מטהרת טרפתה מטומאתה דברי ר' מאיר וי"ל דדברי ר' מאיר לא קאי אכולה מילתא אלא לענין שחיטה ומליקה נקט ליה דפליג עליה ר' יהודה בזבחים בס"פ טבול יום (זבחים דף קה:) דהא דקתני נמי התם דמטמא טומאת אוכלין בכביצה לא אתי כרבי מאיר ולא אמרינן מדסיפא ר' מאיר רישא נמי ר"מ ומיהו לפי מה שרצה הש"ס לדקדק שם מדסיפא רבי מאיר רישא נמי ר' מאיר קשה דאדרבה מדמציעתא דאבר מן החי לאו ר' מאיר רישא נמי לאו ר' מאיר וי"ל דהוה מצי למימר וליטעמיך וק"ק לשון הגמרא התם דקאמר מאן שמעת ליה דאית ליה דמליקתה ושחיטתה מטהרת טרפתה מטומאה ר"מ אמאי צריך לדקדק בענין זה הא קתני בה בהדיא דברי ר"מ:
Rabbi Meir says that the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal applies only with regard to a kosher species of domesticated animal, but not with regard to undomesticated animals or fowl, even if they are kosher.
אלא בבהמה טהורה — ולא בחיה ועוף ואע"פ שהן טהורין:
(סִימָן: שְׁמוּאֵל, שֵׁילָא, שִׁימִי).
The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the different opinions with regard to the name of one of the Sages cited in the upcoming discussion: Shmuel, Sheila, Shimi.
Rabba bar Shmuel said that Rav Ḥisda said, and some say that it was Rav Yosef who said the following statement. And some say the attributions as follows: Rabba bar Sheila said that Rav Ḥisda said, and some say that it was Rav Yosef who said; and some say the attributions as follows: Rabba bar Shimi said that Rav Ḥisda said, and some say that it was Rav Yosef who said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir that the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal applies only with regard to a kosher species of domesticated animal?
It is that the verse states: “Then you shall slaughter of your cattle and of your sheep” (Deuteronomy 12:21). This verse is closely followed by the verse that serves as the source of the prohibition to eat a limb severed from a living animal (Deuteronomy 12:23), indicating that the prohibition applies only to kosher domesticated animals.
Rav Giddel says that Rav says: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Eliezer about whether the prohibition of eating a limb severed from a living animal applies with regard to non-kosher species is only with regard to Jews. But with regard to descendants of Noah, i.e., gentiles, everyone agrees that they are prohibited from eating a limb from a living non-kosher species of animal just like they are prohibited from eating a limb from a living kosher species.
The Gemara comments that this is also taught in a baraita: A descendant of Noah is prohibited from eating a limb from a living animal from non-kosher species just as from kosher species. But a Jew is prohibited from eating a limb from a living animal of kosher species only.
אבל בן נח מוזהר — על הכל דכל דקרינא ביה בשר לחודיה אכול קרינא ביה אבר מן החי לא תאכל:
There are those who say that the correct wording of the baraita is that a Jew is prohibited from eating a limb from a living kosher species, in singular, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the prohibition is limited to kosher domestic animals. And there are those who say that the correct wording of the baraita is that a Jew is prohibited from eating a limb from living kosher species, in plural, and it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that the prohibition also applies to a limb from a living bird or a living undomesticated animal of kosher species.
אית דאמרי טהורה — קתני ואבהמה קאי כר' מאיר ואית דאמרי טהורים קתני ואף חיה ועוף במשמע:
Rav Sheizvi said: We learn in the mishna as well that a gentile is prohibited from eating a limb from a living being even with regard to non-kosher species (Teharot 1:3): If one ate a limb severed from a living non-kosher bird, he does not incur forty lashes, and slaughter does not purify it, i.e., cause it to become permitted for consumption.
אף אנן נמי תנינא — במסכת טהרות דבן נח מוזהר על הטמאין והתם (פ"א מ"א) קאמר י"ג דבר נאמרו בנבלת עוף טהור וכך וכך בנבלת עוף טמא וזו היא מהן:
אכל אבר מן החי ממנה — בעוף טמא קא מיירי:
אינו סופג — וקסבר אינו נוהג בטמאים כרבנן:
ה"ג ואין שחיטתה מטהרתה — ואעוף טמא קאי וקאמר דאין שחיטתה מטהרתה והא דנקיט לה לשון נקבה משום דרישא אתחיל בה לשון נקבה דתנן בה הכי נבלת עוף טמא צריכה מחשבה כו':
אלא לאו בבני נח — דאין שחיטתו מתירתו באכילה כל זמן שמפרכסת גבי נבלת עוף טהור דקתני רישא ושחיטתה מטהרת טרפתה מטומאתה ולא קתני דאין שחיטה מטהרתו כדקתני סיפא גבי טהורה דוקא הוא דאמר שחיטה מכשרה ליה לבני נח מגו דמכשרה לישראל דליכא מידי דלישראל שרי ולעובד כוכבים אסור ותימה דתקשה מהך משנה לרב אחא בר יעקב דאמר לעיל בפ"ב (חולין דף לג.) דאין מזמנין עובד כוכבים על בני מעים ומיהו בלאו הכי אמר לעיל דתניא דלא כוותיה וקושית המשנה אינה פשוטה כל כך:
Rav Sheizvi clarifies: With regard to what case does the mishna issue this ruling? If we say that it is referring to a Jew who ate the limb, it is obvious that slaughter does not purify it, because it is a non-kosher species and cannot be made kosher. Rather is it not referring to descendants of Noah and teaching that even after the bird is slaughtered the limb severed while it was alive remains forbidden? By inference, it is clear from the mishna that it is prohibited for a gentile to eat a limb severed from a living being even from a non-kosher species.
במאי — קתני סיפא אין שחיטתו מטהרתו אי נימא בישראל פשיטא דהא טמא הוא והא ליכא לפרושי מטהרתו מידי טומאת נבלות דעוף טמא אין לו שום טומאה אפילו בבית הבליעה וע"כ אין מתירתו באכילה קאמר אלא לבן נח קאמר שאין שחיטתו מתירתו לו באכילה כל זמן שהוא מפרכס כדאמרינן בפ"ב (לעיל חולין דף לג.) דבן נח לאו בשחיטה תליא מילתא כו' וגבי טהורה הוא דאמרינן שחיטה מכשרא ליה לבן נח מיגו דמכשרא ליה לישראל דליכא מידי דלישראל שרי ולעובד כוכבים אסור שמעינן מינה דאפילו רבנן מודו דבן נח מוזהר על הטומאה באבר מן החי:
Rabbi Mani bar Pattish raises a contradiction between the first clause of that mishna, which states that one does not receive lashes for eating a limb severed from a living non-kosher bird, and the latter clause of the mishna, which states that a limb severed from a living non-kosher bird remains forbidden after the bird is slaughtered. The first clause indicates that the prohibition of eating a limb severed from a living creature applies only to kosher species, while the latter clause indicates that it applies also to non-kosher species. And he answers this contradiction by explaining that the first clause is referring to a Jew and the latter clause is referring to a descendant of Noah.
רמי רישא אסיפא — קתני רישא אינו סופג אלמא אין אבר מן החי נוהג בטמאין והדר תני אין שחיטתו מטהרתו וליכא לאוקומא אלא באבר מן החי אלמא נוהג:
רישא בישראל וסיפא בבן נח — ורבנן היא. ומעיקרא כי רמייה הוה משמע ליה נמי סיפא בבן נח ומיהו לא הוה ידע טעמא והדר פשטה דאפי' למ"ד אין נוהג בטמאין בישראל הוא דקאמר דקרינא ביה כל שאין בשרו מותר אי אתה מצווה על אבריו אבל בבן נח מודה:
new sugyaThe Gemara continues discussing the prohibition of eating a limb severed from a living creature. Rav says: A limb severed from a living animal requires an olive-bulk in order to render one who eats it liable to receive lashes. What is the reason for this? It is because the term: Eating, is written with regard to the prohibition of a limb severed from a living animal, and the definition of eating is the consumption of at least one olive-bulk.
אבר מן החי צריך כזית — אע"ג דתרי קראי כתיבי חד לאבר מן החי וחד לבשר מן החי לא תימא דאתרבי אבר אע"ג דאין בו שיעור אלא ודאי יש בו שיעור בעינן דאין אכילה בפחות מכזית:
Rav Amram raises an objection from the mishna cited above (Teharot 1:3): If one ate a limb severed from a living non-kosher bird, he does not incur the forty lashes, and slaughter does not purify it, i.e., cause it to become permitted. But if it enters your mind that we require an olive-bulk in order for one to receive lashes for eating a limb severed from a living creature, that mishna must be referring to such a case; therefore, it should emerge that he is liable to receive lashes because he ate an olive-bulk of a non-kosher bird.
אכל אבר מן החי ממנה — מעוף טמא:
אינו סופג — דאינו נוהג בטמאין ועל כרחך בדאיכא שיעור דאיסור אבר מן החי בטהורה עסקינן דאי ליכא שיעור פשיטא דאינו סופג ואי ס"ד איסור אבר מן החי בכזית וה"נ דאכל כזית אמאי אינו סופג והא איכא כזית ואיכא לאו דלא (יאכל כי) שקץ הם (ויקרא יא):
The Gemara answers: This can be explained as Rav Naḥman said with regard to another issue, that it is referring to a case of eating a small amount of meat together with sinews and bones and the total volume is an olive-bulk. Here also, the mishna is referring to a case of eating a small amount of meat together with sinews and bones.
כדאמר רב נחמן — לקמן:
במשהו בשר וגידין ועצמות — משלימין לכזית דמשום טומאה לא מחייב דאין בגידין ועצמות טעם טמא ומשום אבר מחייב דלהכי פלגינהו קרא לאבר מן החי ובשר מן החי דמיחייב אאבר אף על גב דאין שיעור בשר ואבשר אע"פ שאינו אבר:
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַב:
The Gemara raises another challenge to Rav’s statement that one receives lashes for eating a limb severed from a living animal only if he eats an olive-bulk: Come and hear a proof in this regard, as Rav said:
בחייה בכל שהוא — משום אבר מן החי. אלמא לא בעינן ביה כזית:
במיתתה בכזית — דבנבלה אכילה כתיבא וכל אכילה בכזית בר מאבר מן החי דרבייה קרא וקפיד אאבר לחודיה:
טמאה בין בחייה בין במיתתה בכל שהוא — חייב דבריה היא ולא צריכה שיעור כדתנן באלו הן הלוקין (מכות דף יג.) באוכל נמלה כל שהוא שהוא חייב משום שהיא כברייתה אלמא בריה אסורה בכל שהוא אבל לאו דנבלה ליכא לחיובי משום בריה דכשנבראת לא היה עליה שם נבלה הלכך אלאו דנבלה לא מיחייב עד כזית. קתני מיהא בטהורה בחייה בכל שהוא:
If one ate a kosher bird alive, one is punished with lashes for any amount, i.e., even if he ate less than an olive-bulk. If the bird was dead and was not ritually slaughtered, one is punished with lashes only if he ate an olive-bulk. And if one ate a whole bird of a non-kosher species, whether he ate it when it was alive or dead, he is punished with lashes for any amount, i.e., even if the bird contained less than an olive-bulk of meat. The Gemara answers: Here also explain that Rav’s statement is referring to a case of eating a small amount of meat along with sinews and bones, and the total volume is an olive-bulk.
אכל צפור כו' הכא נמי במשהו בשר גידים ועצמות — ובין הכל צריך שיהא כזית ולא הוי כמשהו דסיפא דהוי בריה והוי משהו ממש:
נטל צפור — והיא טהורה:
רבי פוטר — מפרש ואזיל דקסבר אין אבר מן החי בשלימה דלאו אבר מיקריא ומיהו אי איכא כזית הוה מיחייב דלא גרע מבשר מן החי דמיחייב עלה בכזית דהא נמי בשר הוא:
ורבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון מחייב — דקסבר שלימה אין לך אבר מן החי גדול מזה ובאבר לא בעינא כזית:
חנקה ואכלה — אין כאן אלא איסור נבלה ואנבלה לא מיחייב משום בריה וכזית בעינן:
Come and hear another challenge based upon a baraita: With regard to one who took a live bird of a kosher species that did not have a volume of an olive-bulk and ate it, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi exempts him from lashes and Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon deems him liable for lashes. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: He should be liable based upon an a fortiori inference: If one is liable to receive lashes for eating a limb of a living animal, all the more so is it not clear that one is liable to receive lashes for eating all of it? The baraita concludes: With regard to one who strangled the bird and ate it, everyone agrees that he is liable to receive lashes only if it had the volume of an olive-bulk.
שאין בו כזית ואכלו רבי פוטר — פי' בקונטרס דקסבר דאין אבר מן החי בשלימה ומיהו אי איכא כזית הוה מחייב דלא גרע מבשר מן החי דמחייב בכזית דהא נמי בשר הוא וקשה לפירושו דאמר בסמוך אכל אבר מן החי ובשר מן הטרפה רבי יוחנן אמר חייב שתים וריש לקיש אמר אינו חייב אלא אחת ומוקי לה בבהמה אחת ונטרפה עם יציאת רובה וקסבר ר"ל דלאו לאברים עומדת ולא אתי איסור אבר מן החי וחייל אאיסור טרפה והשתא מ"מ ליחייב שתים משום טרפה ובשר מן החי דקאתו בהדי הדדי ויש לדחות כגון שאין באבר זה כזית בשר דלא מיחייב משום בשר מן החי והא דחייב משום טרפה היינו כשלקח בשר מטרפה אחרת והשלים לכזית ודוחק הוא ועוד דא"כ אמאי לא חייל עליה איסור אבר מן החי כיון דליכא מטרפה אלא חצי שיעור דבפ' בתרא דיומא (דף עג:) ופרק ג' דשבועות (דף כא:) תניא שבועה שלא אוכל טרפות ונבלות שקצים ורמשים חייב ומוקי לה ר"ל במפרש חצי שיעור אלמא אע"ג דלא חייל איסור שבועה אכזית משום דמושבע ועומד הוא מ"מ חייל אחצי כזית ונראה לפרש כי היכי דלאו לאברים עומדת הכי נמי לאו לחתיכת בשר עומדת והא דנקט צפור שאין בו כזית לרבותא דרבי אלעזר נקט דאפ"ה מחייב ועוד נראה לר"י דאפילו למ"ד לאברים עומדת מודה דלאו לחתיכת בשר עומדת בחייה דאמר ר' יוחנן בסמוך אכל חלב מן החי מן הטרפה חייב שלשה ומוקי לה בנטרפה עם יציאת רובה ובהמה לאברים עומדת דאתי איסור טרפה וחלב ואבר מן החי בהדי הדדי והשתא אמאי נקט טרפה בלאו טרפה איכא ג' אבר מן החי ובשר מן החי וחלב אלא ודאי בהמה בחייה לאו לחתיכת בשר עומדת ולא אתי וחייל על שאר איסורין:
לאברים עומדת — לנתחה עומדת הלכך כל אבר ואבר שבה קרוי אבר בפני עצמו ויש כאן משום אבר מן החי דמיחייב בכל דהו ומיהו חדא הוא דמיחייב דחדא התראה היא:
לאו לאברים עומדת — עד שתשחט ואין כאן שם אבר אא"כ הפרישו אבל דכ"ע לאבר לא בעינן כזית כדקתני ק"ו על אבר ממנה חייב ולא פליג רבי:
The Gemara analyzes the baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, disagree only with regard to one who ate an entire live bird, as one Sage, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that even during its life all creatures stand to be divided into limbs, i.e., they will ultimately be cut into pieces. Consequently, each of its limbs is considered a separate entity, and even if one eats a limb without first separating it from the rest of the body, one violates the prohibition of eating a limb from a living being. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that during its life it does not stand to be divided into limbs. Therefore, one does not violate the prohibition of eating a limb from a living being unless he severs a limb from the body.
במשהו בשר — הא דקתני שאין בו כזית כשאין בו כזית בשר אלא משהו וגידין ועצמות משלימין לכזית:
But in any event, everyone agrees that we do not require one to eat an olive-bulk of meat in order to be liable for lashes for eating a limb from a living being, which is the basis of the a fortiori inference of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Naḥman says in response: Explain that the baraita is referring to a case where one ate a small amount of meat together with sinews and bones, making a total of an olive-bulk.
מי איכא מידי — עוף כחוש כל כך:
דבכוליה ליכא כזית בשר — והוא גדול שבאחת מאבריו איכא כזית במשהו בשר וגידין ועצמות משלימין דקתני על אבר ממנה חייב ואמרת דבכזית עסקינן ורישא קתני שאין בו כזית ומוקמינן דליכא כזית בשר:
The Gemara challenges this answer: But is there any bird that does not have an olive-bulk of meat in its whole body, but in one limb it has an olive-bulk of the combination of a small amount of meat together with sinews and bones? Rav Sherevya said: Yes, this is the case with regard to the kelanita, a bird that is very small and scrawny.
קלניתא עוף טמא הוא — ונהי דליכא איסור נבלה בפחות מכזית איסור טמא מיהא איכא דבריה היא דאמר רב טמאה בין בחייה ובין במיתתה בכל שהוא:
The Gemara challenges this answer that the baraita is referring to a kelanita. Say the latter clause: With regard to one who strangled the bird and ate it, everyone agrees that he is liable to receive lashes only if it had the volume of an olive-bulk. But a kelanita is a non-kosher bird, and Rav says: If one eats a whole non-kosher bird, whether he eats it when it is alive or dead, he is punished with lashes for eating any amount. The Gemara answers: The baraita is not referring to an actual kelanita, but rather to a kosher species of bird similar to a kelanita in that it is small and scrawny.
את"ל — אם תמצא באחד מדבריו של רבי בעלמא דאית ליה מחשבת אוכלין אם חישב לאוכלן כענין זה:
שמה מחשבה — ואזלינן בתרה:
חישב לאוכלה — לצפור זה שאין בה כזית:
אבר אבר — גלי אדעתיה דלאברים עומדת וכי אכלה שלימה נמי אבר קרינא ביה:
new sugyaThe Gemara above cited a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, with regard to one who eats an entire live kosher bird that is less than an olive-bulk. With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that an entire bird is not considered to be a limb and is therefore not included in the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal, Rava said: If you say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that thought with regard to food is considered thought, i.e., one’s thoughts have halakhic significance in determining a food’s status, then in a case where one thought to eat the bird limb by limb, and instead ate it all at once, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would hold that he is liable for transgressing the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal.
אכיל ליה אחר לא מיחייב — דלא אבר מיקריא לחייב עליה בכל שהוא:
Abaye said to Rava: But is there anything with regard to which if another person ate it he would not be liable, but if this person ate it he is liable? Rava said to Abaye: There can be different outcomes for different people who perform the same act, as this individual’s action is judged according to his thought and that individual’s action is judged according to his thought.
And Rava also said: If you say that Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon holds that thought with regard to food is considered thought, then in a case where one at first intended to eat the entire bird after it had died, but ultimately he ate it alive, Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon would hold that he is exempt from lashes, as according to his thought it does not stand to be divided into limbs while alive.
Abaye said to Rava: But is there anything that if another person ate it he would be liable, but if this person ate it he is exempt? Rava said to Abaye: This individual’s action is judged according to his thought and that individual’s action is judged according to his thought.
לא תאכל הנפש עם הבשר זה אבר מן החי — דאבר חי מקרינן נפש שאם יחתכנו אינו עושה חליפין שלא ישוב עוד כנפש הנטולה שאינה חוזרת והכי משמע לא תאכל הנפש בעודו עם הבשר בעוד החיות עם הבשר:
ובשר בשדה — משמע שפירש ממקומו זהו בשר מן החי וטרפה כמשמעו:
new sugyaThe Gemara discusses the source of the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: “You shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23); this is the source for the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal. And the verse: “And you shall not eat any flesh that is torn in the field” (Exodus 22:30); this is the source for the prohibition of eating flesh severed from the living and flesh severed from a tereifa, even if it is not an entire limb.
ובשר בשדה טרפה זה בשר מן החי — מדכתיב בשדה דריש דמשמע שפירש ממקומו ואף על גב דאצטריך לבשר שיצא חוץ ממחיצתו כדאמר בפ' בהמה המקשה (לעיל חולין דף סח:) כולהו דריש מיניה:
וריש לקיש אמר לא תאכל הנפש עם הבשר זה אבר מן החי ובשר מן החי — והכי משמע לא תאכל הנפש ולא תאכל הבשר כל זמן שזה עם זה:
And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: “You shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23); this is the source for the prohibitions of eating a limb from a living animal and of eating flesh severed from the living. And the verse: “And you shall not eat any flesh that is torn in the field” (Exodus 22:30); this is the source for the prohibition of eating flesh severed from a tereifa.
לר' יוחנן חייב שתים — דתרי לאוי איכא ואע"ג דבחדא אכילה וחדא התראה אכלינהו מיחייב תרתי:
אלא אחת — דחד לאו הוא וכיון דבחדא אכילה וחדא התראה וחד לאו הוא חדא הוא דמיחייב וכן כולן:
לדברי הכל חייב שתים — דבין למר ובין למר מתרי קראי נפקי:
The Gemara clarifies the difference between these two opinions. If one ate a limb from a living animal and flesh severed from the living, then according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan he is liable to receive two sets of lashes but according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish he is liable to receive only one set of lashes. Conversely, if one ate flesh severed from the living and flesh severed from a tereifa, then according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish he is liable to receive two sets of lashes but according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan he is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If one ate a limb from a living animal and flesh severed from a tereifa, everyone agrees that he is liable to receive two sets of lashes.
אכל אבר מן החי ובשר מן החי לר' יוחנן חייב שתים — ואע"ג דאין לוקין על לאו שבכללות ה"מ היכא דלא מפרש בקרא כגון (שמות יב) אל תאכלו כי אם צלי אש ומכל אשר יעשה מגפן היין (במדבר ו) אבל ובשר בשדה טרפה דמפרשינן בשר וטריפה לא חשיב ליה לאו שבכללות כמו נא ומבושל וחרצן וזג דמפרשי בקרא לקי וכגון אלמנה וגרושה דלקי לכ"ע:
לרבי יוחנן אינו חייב אלא אחת — משום דמחד קרא נפקי ואף על גב דאנא ומבושל לקי שתים שאני התם דכתיב בוי"ו ובשל דקאי אאל תאכלו והכא נמי אי הוה כתיב בשדה וטרפה לא תאכלו היה לוקה שתים לרבי יוחנן משום בשר מן החי ובשר מן הטריפה:
וּרְמִינְהוּ:
And the Gemara raises a contradiction to the claim that everyone agrees that one who eats both a limb from a living animal and flesh severed from a tereifa is liable to receive two sets of lashes, based upon the following statement:
The Vilna page served by shas.org, one PDF per amud.La página de Vilna servida por shas.org, un PDF por amud.דף וילנא מוגש על ידי shas.org, קובץ PDF אחד לכל עמוד.
Text from Sefaria. Gemara and translation from the William Davidson Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz, CC BY-NC 4.0. Rashi and Tosafot are the Vilna edition, public domain.Texto de Sefaria. La Guemará y su traducción provienen del Talmud William Davidson, con comentario del rabino Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz (traducción al inglés), CC BY-NC 4.0. Rashi y Tosafot son de la edición de Vilna, de dominio público.הטקסט מתוך ספריא. הגמרא והתרגום מתוך תלמוד ויליאם דוידסון, עם פירושו של הרב עדין אבן־ישראל שטיינזלץ (התרגום לאנגלית), CC BY-NC 4.0. רש״י ותוספות הם ממהדורת וילנא, נחלת הכלל.
הדף הזה עדיין לא תורגם לעברית; למטה מופיעה הגרסה האנגלית.
Walking through the sugya, step by step
102a — Whose blood, whose flesh: the two readings
The dispute from yesterday’s last line is laid out in full. Everyone builds on ״לֹא תֹאכַל הַנֶּפֶשׁ
עִם הַבָּשָׂר״ (Devarim 12:23), but they cut it in opposite places.
Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar.
כֹּל שֶׁאַתָּה מְצֻוֶּה עַל דָּמוֹ — אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּה עַל אֵבָרָיו.
“With regard to any animal whose blood you are commanded about, you are commanded about its
limbs.”
Since even a non-kosher animal’s blood is forbidden, its severed limb is forbidden too. Ever min
hachai reaches every species.
The Rabbis. Read the verse the other way — “…the life with the flesh,” but the flesh on its
own. Only a species whose flesh becomes permitted (when it is properly slaughtered) is included; a
non-kosher animal, whose flesh is never permitted, is not.
A sharp question for Rabbi Yehuda — why does he even need the verse? He holds אִיסּוּר חָל עַל
אִיסּוּר, a prohibition takes effect on top of an existing one. Then let the ever prohibition simply
land on the non-kosher-meat prohibition on its own strength — it is the more stringent, שֶׁכֵּן
אִיסּוּרוֹ נוֹהֵג בִּבְנֵי נֹחַ, since it binds the descendants of Noah as well.
The answer — and it quietly reassigns the whole derivation. Indeed so: Rabbi Yehuda needs no
verse. The verse was needed only for Rabbi Elazar, who holds a prohibition does not take
effect on an existing one even when it is more stringent. A baraita confirms exactly this: it is
Rabbi Elazar who learns from ״רַק חֲזַק לְבִלְתִּי אֲכֹל הַדָּם״ that ever min hachai follows the
blood prohibition into every species, while the Rabbis confine it to kosher species from “the flesh
alone.”
Rabbi Meir narrows it further — only a kosher domesticated animal, not a wild animal or a
bird. After a mnemonic for a chain of uncertain attributions (שְׁמוּאֵל, שֵׁילָא, שִׁימִי), Rabba
bar Shmuel — or bar Sheila, or bar Shimi — in the name of Rav Chisda (or Rav Yosef) gives his
reason: the verse ״וְזָבַחְתָּ מִבְּקָרְךָ וּמִצֹּאנְךָ״ sits right beside it, so the prohibition tracks only
cattle and sheep.
102a — The one place everyone agrees: a descendant of Noah
Rav Giddel said Rav: the entire dispute about non-kosher species is only בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, about
Jews. בְּבֶן נֹחַ — for a descendant of Noah — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל, all agree he is warned about the limb
of a non-kosher animal exactly as about a kosher one. A baraita says the same, and a textual variant
even lets you tell which tanna a copy follows: “a kosher animal” in the singular reads like Rabbi
Meir; “kosher animals” in the plural reads like the Rabbis.
Rav Sheizvi finds it in a mishnah too (Teharot 1:3): one who ate a limb from a living
non-kosher bird אֵינוֹ סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, does not incur forty lashes, וְאֵין שְׁחִיטָה מְטַהַרְתָּהּ,
and slaughter does not render it permitted. For a Jew, “slaughter does not help” would be obvious —
it is non-kosher. So the clause must be about a ben Noach, proving the limb of a non-kosher
animal is forbidden to him. Rabbi Mani bar Pattish reads the same mishnah as two clauses in
tension — no lashes, yet slaughter does not purify — and resolves it the same way: the first clause
speaks of a Jew, the latter of a descendant of Noah.
102a–102b — How much is “eating”? An olive-bulk, made of odd parts
Rav:ever min hachai requires a כְּזַיִת, an olive-bulk, for lashes — because the Torah wrote
אֲכִילָה, “eating,” and eating means an olive-bulk.
Rav Amram objects from that same Teharot mishnah: it says one who ate the limb of a non-kosher
bird gets no lashes — but if a kezayit is required, then in the very case the mishnah describes he
did eat a kezayit, and should be flogged for the non-kosher bird itself. The answer, in Rav
Nachman’s phrase: בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ בָּשָׂר גִּידִין וַעֲצָמוֹת — read it as a limb with only a trace of meat,
whose olive-bulk is made up of flesh together with sinews and bones. There is no olive-bulk of
edible flesh, so no lashes for the bird; but there is a whole limb.
A second challenge, from Rav’s own shiurim. Rav taught: eat a kosher bird alive and you are
liable for any amount; eat it dead (unslaughtered) and only for an olive-bulk; a non-kosher
bird, alive or dead, for any amount. If a limb needs an olive-bulk, how can a whole live kosher bird
be “any amount”? Same rescue: sinew and bone fill out the kezayit.
And the case that makes it concrete. Is there really a bird with no olive-bulk of meat in its
whole body, yet an olive-bulk of flesh-with-sinew-and-bone in a single limb? Rav Sherevya: yes —
the קְלָנִיתָא, a tiny, scrawny bird. But the baraita’s end (strangle it and eat it and all agree
you need an olive-bulk) can’t be a real kelanita, which is non-kosher and liable “for any amount.”
So read it as כְּעֵין קְלָנִיתָא — a kosher bird as small as a kelanita.
102b — Does your private intention change the law?
The same baraita had a live-bird dispute: one who ate a kosher bird smaller than an olive-bulk —
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi exempts, Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon holds him liable by a kal vachomer
(if a single limb makes you liable, surely the whole bird does). The Gemara locates the real
disagreement:
מָר סָבַר: בְּחַיֶּיהָ לְאֵבָרִים עוֹמֶדֶת, וּמָר סָבַר: בְּחַיֶּיהָ לָאו לְאֵבָרִים עוֹמֶדֶת.
One holds that in its lifetime the creature already stands divided into limbs — so eating it
whole is eating its limbs; the other holds it does not.
Now Rava’s two thought-experiments (each opened with אִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר, “if you should say”). If
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds מַחְשֶׁבֶת אֳכָלִין שְׁמָהּ מַחְשָׁבָה, that a person’s thought about food has
halachic weight, then someone who planned to eat the bird limb by limb and then ate it whole
would be liable — his intention carved the bird into limbs. And conversely, if Rabbi Elazar bar
Rabbi Shimon holds thought counts, one who planned to eat it dead but ate it alive would be
exempt.
Abaye presses both times with the same needle: is there anything where the identical act makes
one man liable and another not?Rava’s answer is the memorable line:
זֶה לְפִי מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ, וְזֶה לְפִי מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ.
“This one according to his thought, and that one according to his thought.”
The deed is the same; the person is not. Intention is part of the act.
102b — Which verse carries which prohibition
Finally, a clean four-cornered dispute over sourcing. Rabbi Yochanan:״לֹא תֹאכַל הַנֶּפֶשׁ עִם
הַבָּשָׂר״ is ever min hachai (a whole limb from the living); ״וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״
(Shemot 22:30) covers both flesh torn from the living and flesh of a tereifa. Reish Lakish:
the first verse covers ever min hachaiand flesh from the living; the second is tereifa alone.
The stakes are counted in lashes. Eat a limb from the living and flesh from the living: two sets
for Rabbi Yochanan (two verses), one for Reish Lakish (one verse). Eat flesh from the living and
flesh of a tereifa: two sets for Reish Lakish, one for Rabbi Yochanan. Eat a limb from the living
and flesh of a tereifa: everyone agrees, two sets — and it is against that last agreement that
the Gemara raises a contradiction, which is where tomorrow opens.
The distinctions, side by side
Two verses, three prohibitions — and the whole dispute is only about which verse carries which. R’ Yochanan:לֹא תֹאכַל הַנֶּפֶשׁ עִם הַבָּשָׂר is the limb, and וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה covers flesh-from-the-living andtereifa. Reish Lakish: the first verse covers the limb and flesh-from-the-living, and the second is tereifa alone. Count the lashes and the split becomes visible:
Eaten together
R’ Yochanan
Reish Lakish
Where the difference comes from
A limb from the living + flesh from the living
Two sets
One set
Two verses for R’ Yochanan; for Reish Lakish both sit in the same one
Flesh from the living + flesh of a tereifa
One set
Two sets
R’ Yochanan puts both in וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה; Reish Lakish reads that verse as tereifa alone
A limb from the living + flesh of a tereifa
Two sets
Two sets
Different verses on either reading — and it is against this agreement that tomorrow’s contradiction is raised
One line to carry with you
Whether swallowing a tiny bird whole is “eating a limb from the living” turns not on the eater but
on the creature: is a living thing already, in the eye of the law, come apart into its limbs?
Recorriendo la suguiá, paso a paso
102a — De quién es la sangre, de quién es la carne: las dos lecturas
La disputa de la última línea de ayer se expone por completo. Todos construyen sobre ״לֹא תֹאכַל
הַנֶּפֶשׁ עִם הַבָּשָׂר״ (Devarim 12:23), pero la cortan en lugares opuestos.
Rabí Iehudá y Rabí Elazar.
כֹּל שֶׁאַתָּה מְצֻוֶּה עַל דָּמוֹ — אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּה עַל אֵבָרָיו.
“Respecto de todo animal sobre cuya sangre estás mandado, estás mandado sobre sus miembros.”
Dado que incluso la sangre de un animal no kosher está prohibida, su miembro cortado también lo
está. El éver min hajai alcanza a toda especie.
Los Sabios. Lean el versículo al revés — “…la vida con la carne”, pero la carne por sí
sola. Solo se incluye una especie cuya carne llega a permitirse (cuando se la faena como es
debido); un animal no kosher, cuya carne nunca se permite, no.
Una pregunta aguda para Rabí Iehudá — ¿para qué necesita siquiera el versículo? Él sostiene
אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, una prohibición surte efecto encima de una existente. Entonces que la
prohibición del éver simplemente se pose sobre la prohibición de la carne no kosher por su propia
fuerza — es la más estricta, שֶׁכֵּן אִיסּוּרוֹ נוֹהֵג בִּבְנֵי נֹחַ, ya que obliga también a los
descendientes de Nóaj.
La respuesta — y reasigna en silencio toda la derivación. En efecto: Rabí Iehudá no necesita
versículo. El versículo hacía falta solo para Rabí Elazar, que sostiene que una prohibición no
surte efecto sobre una existente ni siquiera cuando es más estricta. Una baraita lo confirma
exactamente: es Rabí Elazar quien aprende de ״רַק חֲזַק לְבִלְתִּי אֲכֹל הַדָּם״ que el éver min hajai
sigue a la prohibición de la sangre en toda especie, mientras que los Sabios lo confinan a las
especies kosher desde “la carne sola”.
Rabí Meir lo estrecha aún más — solo un animal doméstico kosher, no un animal salvaje ni un
ave. Tras un mnemónico para una cadena de atribuciones inciertas (שְׁמוּאֵל, שֵׁילָא, שִׁימִי), Rabá
bar Shmuel — o bar Sheila, o bar Shimi — en nombre de Rav Jisda (o Rav Iosef) da su razón: el
versículo ״וְזָבַחְתָּ מִבְּקָרְךָ וּמִצֹּאנְךָ״ está justo al lado, así que la prohibición sigue solo al ganado
vacuno y ovino.
102a — El único punto en que todos concuerdan: un descendiente de Nóaj
Rav Guidel dijo Rav: toda la disputa sobre las especies no kosher es solo בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, sobre
judíos. בְּבֶן נֹחַ — para un descendiente de Nóaj — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל, todos concuerdan en que está
advertido sobre el miembro de un animal no kosher exactamente como sobre uno kosher. Una baraita
dice lo mismo, y una variante textual incluso te permite saber a qué tana sigue una copia: “un
animal kosher” en singular se lee como Rabí Meir; “animales kosher” en plural se lee como los
Sabios.
Rav Sheizvi lo encuentra también en una mishná (Teharot 1:3): quien comió un miembro de un ave
no kosher viva אֵינוֹ סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, no recibe cuarenta azotes, וְאֵין שְׁחִיטָה מְטַהַרְתָּהּ, y la
faena no lo vuelve permitido. Para un judío, “la faena no ayuda” sería obvio — es no kosher. Así que
la cláusula ha de ser sobre un ben Nóaj, probando que el miembro de un animal no kosher le está
prohibido. Rabí Maní bar Patish lee la misma mishná como dos cláusulas en tensión — sin azotes,
y sin embargo la faena no purifica — y la resuelve del mismo modo: la primera cláusula habla de un
judío, la última de un descendiente de Nóaj.
102a–102b — ¿Cuánto es “comer”? Un volumen de aceituna, hecho de partes raras
Rav: el éver min hajai requiere un כְּזַיִת, un volumen de aceituna, para los azotes — porque
la Torá escribió אֲכִילָה, “comer”, y comer significa un volumen de aceituna.
Rav Amram objeta desde esa misma mishná de Teharot: dice que quien comió el miembro de un ave
no kosher no recibe azotes — pero si se requiere un kezait, entonces en el caso mismo que la mishná
describe él sí comió un kezait, y debería ser azotado por el ave no kosher en sí. La
respuesta, en la frase de Rav Najmán: בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ בָּשָׂר גִּידִין וַעֲצָמוֹת — léelo como un miembro con
apenas una traza de carne, cuyo volumen de aceituna se compone de carne junto con nervios y
huesos. No hay un volumen de aceituna de carne comestible, así que no hay azotes por el ave; pero
hay un miembro entero.
Un segundo desafío, desde las propias medidas de Rav. Rav enseñó: come un ave kosherviva y
eres responsable por cualquier cantidad; cómela muerta (sin faenar) y solo por un volumen de
aceituna; un ave no kosher, viva o muerta, por cualquier cantidad. Si un miembro necesita un
volumen de aceituna, ¿cómo puede un ave kosher viva entera ser “cualquier cantidad”? El mismo
rescate: el nervio y el hueso completan el kezait.
Y el caso que lo vuelve concreto. ¿Existe realmente un ave sin un volumen de aceituna de carne en
todo su cuerpo, y sin embargo con un volumen de aceituna de carne-con-nervio-y-hueso en un solo
miembro? Rav Sherevia: sí — la קְלָנִיתָא, un ave diminuta y esmirriada. Pero el final de la
baraita (estrangúlala y cómela y todos concuerdan en que necesitas un volumen de aceituna) no puede
ser una kelanita real, que es no kosher y responsable “por cualquier cantidad”. Así que léelo como
כְּעֵין קְלָנִיתָא — un ave kosher tan pequeña como una kelanita.
102b — ¿Tu intención privada cambia la ley?
La misma baraita traía una disputa sobre el ave viva: quien comió un ave kosher menor que un volumen
de aceituna — Rabí Iehudá HaNasí exime, Rabí Elazar bar Rabí Shimón lo hace responsable por un
kal vajómer (si un solo miembro te hace responsable, con más razón el ave entera). La Guemará
localiza el desacuerdo real:
מָר סָבַר: בְּחַיֶּיהָ לְאֵבָרִים עוֹמֶדֶת, וּמָר סָבַר: בְּחַיֶּיהָ לָאו לְאֵבָרִים עוֹמֶדֶת.
Uno sostiene que en su vida la criatura ya se sostiene dividida en miembros — así que comerla
entera es comer sus miembros; el otro sostiene que no.
Ahora los dos experimentos mentales de Rava (cada uno abierto con אִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר, “si has de
decir”). Si Rabí Iehudá HaNasí sostiene מַחְשֶׁבֶת אֳכָלִין שְׁמָהּ מַחְשָׁבָה, que el pensamiento de una
persona sobre la comida tiene peso halájico, entonces quien planeó comer el ave miembro por
miembro y luego la comió entera sería responsable — su intención talló el ave en miembros. Y a la
inversa, si Rabí Elazar bar Rabí Shimón sostiene que el pensamiento cuenta, quien planeó comerla
muerta pero la comió viva quedaría exento.
Abaie presiona las dos veces con la misma aguja: ¿hay algo donde el acto idéntico haga
responsable a un hombre y no a otro?La respuesta de Rava es la línea memorable:
זֶה לְפִי מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ, וְזֶה לְפִי מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ.
“Este según su pensamiento, y aquel según su pensamiento.”
El hecho es el mismo; la persona no. La intención es parte del acto.
102b — Qué versículo lleva qué prohibición
Por fin, una disputa limpia de cuatro esquinas sobre la fuente. Rabí Iojanán:״לֹא תֹאכַל הַנֶּפֶשׁ
עִם הַבָּשָׂר״ es éver min hajai (un miembro entero de lo vivo); ״וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״
(Shemot 22:30) abarca tanto la carne arrancada de lo vivo como la carne de un taref. Reish
Lakish: el primer versículo abarca el éver min hajaiy la carne de lo vivo; el segundo es
taref solo.
Lo que está en juego se cuenta en azotes. Come un miembro de lo vivo y carne de lo vivo: dos
series para Rabí Iojanán (dos versículos), una para Reish Lakish (un versículo). Come carne de lo
vivo y carne de un taref: dos series para Reish Lakish, una para Rabí Iojanán. Come un miembro
de lo vivo y carne de un taref: todos concuerdan, dos series — y es contra ese último acuerdo
que la Guemará plantea una contradicción, que es donde abre mañana.
Las distinciones, lado a lado
Dos versículos, tres prohibiciones — y toda la disputa es solo sobre cuál versículo lleva cuál. R’ Iojanán:לֹא תֹאכַל הַנֶּפֶשׁ עִם הַבָּשָׂר es el miembro, y וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה cubre la carne de lo vivo y el taref. Reish Lakish: el primer versículo cubre el miembro y la carne de lo vivo, y el segundo es solo el taref. Cuenta los azotes y la división se vuelve visible:
Comidos juntos
R’ Iojanán
Reish Lakish
De dónde viene la diferencia
Un miembro de lo vivo + carne de lo vivo
Dos series
Una serie
Dos versículos para R’ Iojanán; para Reish Lakish ambos caen en el mismo
Carne de lo vivo + carne de un taref
Una serie
Dos series
R’ Iojanán pone ambos en וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה; Reish Lakish lee ese versículo como solo taref
Un miembro de lo vivo + carne de un taref
Dos series
Dos series
Versículos distintos en cualquiera de las dos lecturas — y es contra este acuerdo que mañana se plantea la contradicción
Una línea para llevarte
Que tragarse un ave diminuta entera sea “comer un miembro de lo vivo” no depende del que come sino
de la criatura: ¿está una cosa viva ya, a los ojos de la ley, deshecha en sus miembros?
🎯 Test yourselfPonte a pruebaבחנו את עצמכם
Tip: click the card, then keys 1–4 answer and Enter moves on.Consejo: pulsa en la tarjeta; luego 1–4 responden y Enter continúa.טיפ: הקישו על הכרטיס; אחר כך 1–4 עונים ו-Enter ממשיך.
Tomorrow (Tue, 11 August 2026):
Chullin 103 — one animal or two, and how many sets of lashes stack when a limb, a tereifa and forbidden fat all come into being **בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי** — at one and the same moment.
Mañana (mar, 11 de agosto de 2026):
Julín 103 — un animal o dos, y cuántas series de azotes se apilan cuando un miembro, un taref y la grasa prohibida llegan todos **בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי** — en un solo y mismo instante.